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International Legal Updates
North America
Canada Leaves United States and
New Zealand Behind: Pledges to
Adopt UN Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
After almost 22 years of debate, and
nearly a quarter century after the formation of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (WGIP), the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples on September 13, 2007. As the UN
explains, the Declaration was intended
to emphasize “the rights of indigenous
peoples to maintain and strengthen their
own institutions, cultures and traditions
and to pursue their development in keeping with their own needs and aspirations.”
Even though UN declarations are generally
not legally binding, four Member States
with sizeable indigenous populations —
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the
United States — initially voted against the
Declaration. The turbulent relationships
between these states’ governments and
indigenous populations provide a possible
explanation for their decisions not to adopt
the Declaration, but their votes pitted them
against 143 other UN Member States that
voted for the Declaration.
In an apparent reversal of policy, on
March 3, 2010, the Governor General
of Canada, Michaëlle Jean, delivered the
annual “Speech from the Throne” before the
Canadian parliament and announced that
Canada would soon adopt the Declaration.
While the Governor General’s statement is
not a formal adoption, the “Speech from
the Throne” is used to “outline the broad
agenda” of the Canadian government, much
like the “State of the Union” address given
by the U.S. President, and can indicate top
governmental priorities. Once Canada formally adopts the Declaration, it will join
Australia, which in April 2009 announced
that it would change its stance on the
Declaration. Australia’s formal adoption of
the Declaration has been part of a general
shift in that country’s policy towards its
indigenous population, culminating in a
controversial review of its policy towards
aboriginal customary law. Both Australia

and now Canada have taken broad, discrete
steps towards recognizing fundamental
rights of indigenous communities.
Canada’s move towards adopting the
Declaration leaves the United States and
New Zealand as the only remaining UN
Member States that still stand against it.
Both countries have significant indigenous
populations, to whom the adoption of the
Declaration would likely be a meaningful
gesture. While adopting the Declaration is
only symbolic because it does not include
any binding provisions, the very lack of
binding elements makes the United States’
and New Zealand’s opposition significant — New Zealand cited fundamental
conflicts with its constitution and laws
as the primary reasons for opposing the
Declaration and the United States said that
the Declaration itself was not clear enough
to warrant support and that it failed even
as an aspirational document. Neither of
these criticisms seems to take into account
the non-binding nature of the Declaration.
The Obama administration in the United
States has deflected criticism about its
position on the Declaration by saying that
its position on the issue is “under review.”
New Zealand Prime Minister John Key
made a similar statement when asked about
his government’s position in mid-2009.
However, with such global consensus on
the issue of indigenous rights and several
years of real-life application to dispel concerns that the Declaration could be used in
unforeseen ways, excuses for delaying the
adoption of the Declaration are running
short for both the United States and New
Zealand.

Repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
In his first State of the Union address
on January 27, 2010, President Barack
Obama explicitly stated his plans to end the
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT)
policy on gays and lesbians serving in
the armed forces: “This year, I will work
with Congress and our military to finally
repeal the law that denies gay Americans
the right to serve the country they love
because of who they are.” The President
is not alone in his belief that the policy
should come to an end. Nearly two out of
40

three Americans believe the policy constitutes discrimination and 57 percent believe
that gays and lesbians should be allowed
to serve openly in the military, according
to a February 2010 Quinnipiac University
poll. Still, the policy has persisted well into
the President’s term and no concrete action
has yet been taken while DADT discharges
continue. In fiscal year 2009 alone, 428
service members were discharged despite
continued U.S. involvement in two wars.
With public opinion supporting the repeal
of the policy, the continued gap between
the President’s rhetoric and his actions
risks squandering the apparent momentum
toward the abolition of DADT.
There are several different legal avenues available by which to repeal DADT.
Because the policy was enacted under
the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense
Authorization Act, any actual repeal of
the law would have to come from either
Congress or the courts. So far, President
Obama has advocated against attempts in
Congress to introduce legislation repealing
the law or suspending discharges. In June
2009, the Supreme Court declined to hear
an appeal challenging the constitutionality
of the policy, indicating the Court is not
currently interested in addressing the issue.
The latest Congressional development
came when Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT)
introduced a bill to repeal DADT, but
sources have suggested that the President
supports including the measure in the 2011
appropriations bill for the Department of
Defense, at the earliest. The President continues to decline to take immediate action,
though the recent DADT modification by
Defense Secretary Gates, making it more
difficult to discharge under the policy, is a
step in the right direction.
While economic and health care issues
have been at the forefront of political
debate during President Obama’s first year
in office, all other issues need not be
ignored. Concerns about momentum, in
addition to the continued loss of valuable military time, resources, and personnel to a discriminatory policy, only
strengthen the case for immediate action.
If President Obama is committed to repealing DADT, he should use his own power
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as commander-in-chief to strengthen the
military by halting discharges under the
policy and he should not stand in the
way of Congress’s efforts to take action.
Using U.S. involvement in two war zones
as justification to continue to discharge
soldiers willing to fight for their country
is arguably not the best way to support the
U.S. military. In fact, many scholars have
argued quite the opposite.

A Step Forward for Immigrants’
Rights in the United States?
Until March 31, 2010, Jose Padilla
awaited deportation from the United
States, where he has lived for forty years.
A Vietnam veteran and a commercial
truck driver, Padilla was convicted in
2001 of possession and transportation of
marijuana, which made his deportation
mandatory under the current immigration laws. However, on March 31, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v.
Kentucky that Padilla had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
criminal defense attorney failed to inform
him that he could be deported if found
guilty of the drug charges. In so holding,
the Supreme Court has fortified the barrier
against attorneys’ failure to advise their
clients of the consequences of pleading
guilty, first established by Strickland v.
Washington. Padilla explicitly recognizes
that Strickland protects non-citizens facing
the possibility of deportation, if convicted.
Padilla is a much-needed check on the
ongoing attempts to narrow constitutional
protections afforded to non-citizens.
In the context of cases like Padilla’s,
the enforcement arm of the U.S. immigration system, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), has stated that its goal
is to “identify and remove criminal aliens
from the United States” with an emphasis
on violent or “Level 1” offenders who are
considered “dangerous criminal aliens.”
However, isolating “dangerous criminal
aliens” solely by classes of crimes, especially individual, non-violent narcotics
crimes, is unlikely to achieve this goal.
Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged
in Padilla that immigration policy has
shifted from discretion to dogma, resulting in questionable deportations. The ruling takes a step towards restoring some
“discretionary authority” for judges by
allowing them to determine if non-citizens
have been apprised of the possibility, or in

some cases, probability of deportation as a
result of pleading guilty to a crime. As the
Court concluded, deportation must be considered a direct consequence of conviction
— rather than merely “collateral” — of
which attorneys have an affirmative duty
to inform their clients.
While the Supreme Court’s holding
in Padilla does offer some protection for
non-citizens with respect to adequacy of
legal counsel in criminal proceedings, it
does nothing to alter immigration laws in
the United States. Padilla still faces possible deportation because, on remand, he
may still be convicted of the crimes to
which he originally pleaded guilty. His
deportation is likely inevitable under current immigration law, given the thousand
pounds of marijuana that he was caught
trying to transport. Others, however, like
Jerry Lemaine, who faces deportation after
being caught with one marijuana cigarette
even though he has been a legal noncitizen resident since he left Haiti at age
three, could benefit from increased judicial
discretionary authority in deportation proceedings. Lemaine’s case, which is before
the Supreme Court now and was argued on
the same day that the Padilla decision was
issued, has the potential to protect legalized non-citizens from deportation if they
are convicted of more than one minor drug
offense (such as possession of small quantities of marijuana). This is not to say that
non-citizens should always be protected
from deportation due to drug charges. As
Justice Stevens noted in Padilla, the major
change in immigration law over the past
ninety years, and the likely source of much
injustice, is the lack of discretionary power
on the part of judges — both immigration
and criminal. This is the policy that begs
review.
Evan Wilson, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers North America for the
Human Rights Brief.

Latin America
Brazilian Military Rejects Lula’s
Truth Commission
Hours after President Luiz Inácio
(“Lula”) da Silva of Brazil announced
plans in December 2009 to set up a truth
commission that would investigate crimes
committed during the military dictator41

ships, Brazil’s top military officials threatened their resignations if Lula did not
retract the proposal. Lula, however, told
the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva
in early March 2010 that the country
had created a National Truth Commission.
Military officials are concerned about
opening military archives to the commission because hundreds of Brazilians are
alleged to have been tortured, kidnapped,
disappeared, and murdered by the military
government between 1964 and 1985. To
assuage his officials’ concerns, Lula has
set up a working group of representatives
from the justice department, homeland
affairs, the human rights department, the
military, and civil society. The group will
have to agree on the workings of the truth
commission, as Lula promised that the
commission will not judge people, but will
seek to understand the truth of what happened from 1964 to 1985.
The Brazilian government has been
hesitant to create a truth commission
because of its 1979 law providing amnesty
to military and political officials who committed political or electoral crimes from
1961 to 1979. The amnesty law, however,
may violate the American Convention of
Human Rights (ACHR), which Brazil ratified in 1979, because it prevents judicial
proceedings for and investigations of serious violations of non-derogable human
rights such as the right to life. In 2001, the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(IACtHR), a body whose jurisdiction Brazil
recognized when it ratified the ACHR, held
that Peru’s failure to investigate and punish
crimes relating to the military’s massacre
of alleged Sendero Luminoso members
violated the Convention. The Peruvian government refused to investigate the crime
because of its law providing amnesty to
police and military officials who committed crimes during the period from 1980
to 1995. In Barrios Altos v. Peru, the
IACtHR found that the Peruvian amnesty
law violated the government’s duties under
international human rights law, and held
that “all amnesty provisions . . . for serious
human rights violations such as torture,
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, [are] prohibited because they violate non-derogable
rights recognized by international human
rights law.”
Because the Brazilian amnesty law has
been interpreted to protect people who
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have committed torture, and because freedom from torture is a non-derogable right
under the ACHR, the law is incompatible
with the Court’s decision under Barrios
Altos. Brazil’s amnesty law should therefore be repealed and should not bar the
creation of a truth commission.

excuse for perpetuating the state of impunity. It must follow its neighbors in creating a truth commission that will investigate
past human rights abuses and eventually
prosecute those responsible for serious
violations of international law.

Truth commissions are meant to be
non-judicial investigations into past periods of violence during which human rights
violations were systematically committed.
They are part of a process to end impunity
for serious rights violations and can lead
to justice and reparations for victims and
their families. Some truth commissions are
granted subpoena power from the legislature, while others rely specifically on voluntary participation. It is unclear what type
of powers the Brazilian truth commission
would have, but it would certainly need
access to military archives and testimony
to have a clear picture of what transpired.
But since the 1979 law provides amnesty
for political crimes and politically motivated crimes, the commission might have
difficulty accessing information.

Anti-Terrorism Case against
Chiquita Moves Ahead

By assisting in the investigation of
crimes, truth commissions help uphold
citizens’ right to know about the past. The
IACtHR’s decision in Barrios Altos recognized and protected the right to know by
declaring the non-investigation of abuses
a violation of the ACHR. Despite Brazil’s
national laws, it too has the obligation to
end the impunity for crimes committed
during the dictatorships and ensure its citizens know about past crimes. Brazil cannot
use its amnesty law as an excuse not to create a truth commission.
Most of Brazil’s neighbors with similar
histories have gone beyond the creation of
truth commissions and have begun prosecuting individuals who committed serious
violations of international human rights
law. Although a small group of six representatives is currently discussing how the
Brazilian truth commission will function,
it is important for victims to participate
in the process to ensure the commission
addresses their needs. Furthermore, the
government should create a truth commission through the legislature to ensure
that the commission has the appropriate
authority and funding to investigate crimes
and preserve evidence for later prosecution. Given the evolution of international
law over the past ten years, Brazil can no
longer hide behind its amnesty law as an

A suit against Chiquita Brands
International filed by families of Americans
kidnapped and killed by the FARC guerrilla force of Colombia will continue in
federal courts after U.S. Judge Kenneth
Marra of the Southern District of Florida
rejected Chiquita’s motion to dismiss on
February 4, 2010. The plaintiffs are family
members of five men who worked as missionaries in Panama across the border from
Colombia in the 1990s. FARC kidnapped
the men separately, demanded ransom, and
then killed them. The plaintiffs are most
likely suing Chiquita in U.S. court, rather
than filing suit against FARC in either U.S.
or Colombian courts because Chiquita is
a large, identifiable corporation with high
profits, whereas it would be difficult to
find the members of FARC who committed the crimes and prosecute them in any
forum. Therefore, the plaintiffs are likely to
have more success at recovering damages
against Chiquita than against individual
members of FARC.
The U.S. Secretary of State declared
FARC, a group that controls vast areas of
Colombia, a foreign terrorist organization
in 1997 because of its violent acts, kidnappings, and bombings. Plaintiffs allege that
Chiquita gave FARC money, which supported the organization’s violent actions
and resulted in their family members’
death. Chiquita, however, claims it was
forced to pay the guerrillas in order to
work in remote areas of the country. Judge
Marra’s decision to allow the suit to proceed sends a message to U.S. corporations that they may face liability if they
finance international terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs’ attorney Greg Hansel told
the Human Rights Brief that “the families
intend to hold Chiquita accountable for
supporting Colombian terrorists to make a
buck selling bananas.”
The case was filed under the AntiTerrorism Act of 1991(18 U.S.C. § 2331),
a statute allowing U.S. citizens and their
heirs to sue for injuries resulting from acts
of international terrorism. Although the
42

statute broadly states that a plaintiff may
sue for “an act of international terrorism”
without specifying who the plaintiffs may
sue, the Chiquita case stands with other
case law to include organizations supporting terrorist groups as possible defendants.
Under the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery,
Chiquita violated the Anti-Terrorism Act
when it aided and abetted FARC’s terrorist
activities by providing the guerrillas with
money. Chiquita’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted asserted that mere payments
to FARC are not covered by the statute
because they did not constitute violent acts
dangerous to human life so as to meet the
statute’s partial definition of “acts of international terrorism.”
While Chiquita’s payments to FARC
by themselves may not have been acts of
international terrorism, the court noted that
under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the plaintiffs
did not need to show that Chiquita committed acts of terrorism in order to hold
Chiquita liable. The plaintiffs simply had
to be injured by acts of international terrorism, which they were. Furthermore,
the court found that plaintiffs provided
sufficient evidence that Chiquita provided
resources for FARC, which subsequently
killed the missionaries.
Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), the
co-sponsor of the bill that became the AntiTerrorism Act, said that the Act sought to
ensure that “American victims [of terrorism would] be able to bring a claim against
a terrorist group for money damages.”
Judge Marra noted, however, that the case
law construing the statute shows that the
Anti-Terrorist Act also extends secondary
liability to aiders and abettors who provide
money to international terrorist groups.
According to the U.S. Department
of Justice, in 2007 Chiquita admitted to
paying another Colombian group considered a terrorist organization. The company paid Colombian paramilitary group,
the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(AUC), from about 1997 to 2004, even
after Chiquita knew that the U.S. government considered them a foreign terrorist
organization. In that case, Chiquita entered
a plea agreement with the U.S. government in which it paid U.S. $25 million and
admitted to paying an international terrorist group while hiding the information in
its records.
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That Chiquita admitted to paying the
AUC leads to a reasonable inference that
the company was also paying FARC. As
such, Judge Marra agreed that there was
sufficient evidence to prove that Chiquita
knew that FARC was a foreign terrorist
organization, but nevertheless continued
supporting the group.
The lawsuit has sparked two similar
suits against Chiquita: one brought under
the Alien Torts Statute by hundreds of
Colombians whose family members were
killed by FARC and another suit by shareholders of Chiquita against the corporation. The Alien Torts Statute grants jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts to hear civil
cases brought by non-U.S. citizens. The
Colombian plaintiffs’ case follows similar
reasoning as the cause brought by the missionaries’ family members: that Chiquita’s
payments to FARC helped the group continue its acts of violence, resulting in their
family members deaths. Both the case
brought by the Colombians and the one
brought by shareholders are pending in
federal courts, and the case under the AntiTerrorism Act is the first case to reach a
judgment thus far.
Tracey Begley, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Latin America for the
Human Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Burundians Resort to Mob Violence
to Address Crime
On March 26, 2010, Human Rights
Watch and the Association for the
Protection of Human Rights and Detained
Persons reported that many Burundian citizens do not trust in the state police force
and have instead resorted to vigilantism
and mob violence to respond to crimes.
In 2008, at least 88 people were killed or
injured by mobs. In 2009, at least 74 suspected criminals were killed and 59 were
injured by civilian mobs, without repercussions by the police and sometimes with
their explicit consent or encouragement.
In one of the poorest nations in the
world that has only recently emerged from
civil war, the position of frustrated mobs is
understandable. Citizens have commented
that when they rely on the police, suspected
criminals are freed a few days after arrest.
Moreover, considering that as of February

2010 no one in Burundi has been convicted
for participating in a mob, people have few
disincentives from resorting to mob justice.
However, the position of thieves is also
sympathetic. In August 2009, a 54-yearold HIV-positive man who was unable to
work stole bananas from a neighbor’s field.
When discovered, the man was caught by a
mob, covered in dry grass, and burned to
death. While mobs are desperate because
thieves who steal their valuable property
go unpunished by official forces, such
extreme violence against equally sympathetic people is excessive and unjust.
Not even law enforcement is protected
from the anger and frustration of mobs, due
in part to the violent past of some members
of the force, the tendency for police to be
involved in criminal activity, and their perceived impunity. Since 2005, when many
former civil war rebels were integrated into
the police force, 100 policemen have been
imprisoned for violent offenses. While the
violence in the police force is disturbing,
the imprisonment of at least some officers
demonstrates that there is not complete
impunity. However, many villagers have
a different perception. In the province of
Ruyigi, two policemen were stoned to
death by a mob after they went into a village with weapons and two grenades in
order to steal. In February 2008, six armed
policemen were attacked and beaten when
they entered a local village. Because of
rising crime, the crowd assumed the men
were robbers, and two of the officers were
beaten to death.
In March 2006, the United Nations
released an interim report on the human
rights situation in Burundi that concluded
that Burundi was not meeting its Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement obligations to reform its justice system and
provide trained law enforcement with
proper equipment. Also, Articles 14 and
15 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which
Burundi is a signatory, require all people
to be informed of charges against them
and have those charges investigated. By
allowing mobs to respond to crimes, the
government is undermining the rule of
law and permitting repeated violations of
the Burundi Code of Criminal Procedure,
which requires all crimes to be openly
investigated by the police. While Burundi’s
poverty and transition from civil war have
made it difficult for the government to cre43

ate an effective law enforcement system,
it is unacceptable for public officials to
quietly allow civilian mobs to respond to
criminal activity, denying suspects access
to the legal system and denying them due
process or the rule of law.

Women in Swaziland Still Have
Limited Property Rights
The High Court in Swaziland ruled
on February 23, 2010 that some married
women will be allowed to own property
in their own names for the first time.
This decision comes five years after the
adoption of Swaziland’s 2005 constitution, which guarantees women equal rights
and protections under Sections 20 and 28,
and declares any contrary laws void under
Section 2. Yet since 2005, the legislature
has not amended or repealed any laws to
meet this requirement.
In 2009, female attorney and women’s
rights advocate Doo Aphane filed a lawsuit in the High Court, challenging Section
16(3) of the Deeds Registry Act as contrary
to the Constitution. The law treats women
as minors and prohibits them from registering property. This allows men to buy or sell
property without consulting their wives,
but prevents women from doing the same
without their husbands’ consent.
This law’s discriminatory impact is
exacerbated if a woman chooses to leave
her husband. One Swazi woman paid for
property solely with her earnings, but registered it in her husband’s name. Ten years
later, her husband chased her away from
her home and brought a mistress to live on
the property. Under Swazi law, the woman
had no right to the property, despite having
paid for it in full. Swaziland also has the
highest HIV/AIDS rate in the world, leading to greater numbers of younger widows.
Because a woman cannot own property,
Swazi law transfers the land back to the
husband’s family upon his death, leaving
many widows with no legal protections.
The February 2010 judgment that some
married women can register property will
affect between twenty and thirty percent
of marriages, because it applies only to
civil ceremony marriages and most Swazi
people are married under customary law.
However, Aphane is hopeful that the ruling
will educate people about women’s rights
and encourage further reforms. Ideally, the
legislature would enact sweeping reforms
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to adhere to the Constitution, since challenging laws in the courts is slow and
expensive for litigants.
Beyond being bound by its Constitution,
Swaziland is subject to Articles 3 and 14 of
the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, which guarantee all people rights
to equal protection and to own property.
Articles 6 and 15 of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women, to which Swaziland is
a signatory, give women equal rights to
enter into contracts and own property and
require all states to eliminate any discriminatory laws. The recent judgment was a
small step towards giving women equal
protection, but the legislature must take
more proactive steps to prevent continued
discrimination against women.

Human Rights Group Challenges
Uganda’s Polygamy Laws
The women’s rights organization
MIFUMI filed a petition at the Ugandan
Constitutional Court on January 28, 2010,
asking the court to outlaw polygamy.
MIFUMI claims that polygamy violates
equality between men and women and
leads to violence, abandonment, neglect,
and an increased risk of HIV and AIDS.
The Ugandan Attorney General filed a
response to the petition, arguing that polygamy is protected under Article 37 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda,
which guarantees the right to culture, tradition, and religion.
Current polygamy laws in Uganda apply
to people differently because Uganda recognizes four types of marriage: customary,
church and civil, Muslim, and Hindu. Section
12 of the Customary Marriages Registration
Act and Section 2 of the Mohammedans
Act validate polygamy. In contrast, Section
42 of the Marriage Act states that a person
who knowingly enters into a marriage with
someone who is already married commits
an offense punishable with a maximum
five-year prison sentence.
MIFUMI contends that polygamy
is the most significant factor perpetuating violence against women and children. Patriarchal hierarchy in polygamous
unions creates familial unrest, which leads
to violence when men attempt to dominate and control their wives. Additionally,
if husbands divide property and assets
unequally, it leads to intense competition

between wives. For example, on February
18, 2010, one woman stabbed and killed
her fellow wife in a domestic dispute over
fetching water.
The Domestic Relations Bill Coalition
(DRBC) is a group of over forty women’s
and human rights organizations that has
advocated for a uniform domestic relations
law that conforms to the constitutional
right to gender equality. In a 2003 report,
DRBC noted that children often suffer
from neglect in polygamous families. Since
each wife often has her own house and the
husband rotates to each house, many children do not receive regular attention from
their fathers and are not able to live with
them. This violates Article 34(1) of the
Constitution, which gives children the right
“to know and be cared for by” their fathers,
and the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, which stipulates the
child’s right to reside with her father and
not to be separated from him against the
child’s will.
Further, MIFUMI argues that polygamy
contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS,
violating constitutional health protections.
Each time a man marries, all his wives are
exposed to an increased risk of contracting
HIV. Additionally, men sometimes inherit
widows from other men or a relative who
died from AIDS, making the spread of
infection even more likely.
In response to allegations that polygamy violates Sections 33(4) and (6) of
the Constitution, which prohibit any laws,
traditions, or customs that violate women’s
rights, the Attorney General claims that
polygamy is protected by Section 27 of the
Constitution, which guarantees a person’s
right to culture. Since women can choose
what type of marriage to enter, he argues
that the current legal system protects the
right to culture and religion, while respecting a woman’s right to elect the type of
marriage she wishes.
MIFUMI claims that the Attorney
General’s position is unfounded. While culture is important, it cannot be used to oppress
women or deny them equality. Additionally,
polygamy violates equal protection because
women cannot marry more than one man.
Because Section 33 of the Constitution says
that customs that violate equal protection
are illegal, the Constitutional Court should
take advantage of the opportunity to clarify
the nation’s laws and to declare polygamy
unconstitutional.
44

Caitlin Shay, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers sub-Saharan Africa for the
Human Rights Brief.

Middle East and North Africa
Saudi Women Lawyers Free to
Practice Law
Thirty years after earning her law degree,
Fatma Kabil, Saudi Arabia’s first qualified
female lawyer, may finally get the chance
to argue in a courtroom. On February 20,
2010, Justice Minister of Saudi Arabia
Mohammad al-Issa announced that Saudi
Arabia would soon issue a new draft law,
confirming rumors circulating since last
fall that the government may reform its
laws relating to female lawyers. The law,
which will come into force once the Justice
Minister sets specific guidelines, would
permit Saudi women lawyers to set up their
own legal practices and represent their clients in court on cases relating to familial
relations.
The Justice Minister’s announcement is
widely heralded as progressive in a country
that is well known for harshly restricting
women’s rights. Saudi Arabia has yet to
comply with recommendations to end its
male guardianship system from the UN
Human Rights Council in 2009. The system treats women as minors and forbids
women from undertaking basic activities
like studying, traveling, marrying, accessing health care, or filing a court case without first obtaining permission from a male
guardian.
In this environment, the Justice
Minister’s announcement came as a shock
to many. While women are currently permitted to obtain a law degree and work in
segregated offices, this right is curtailed
by their inability to represent their clients
in courts or to open their own practices.
Under the new draft law, if and when it
comes into force, women will be able to
bring family law-related cases to court.
As a result, women will be able to secure
more jobs, and female clients may be more
likely to bring sensitive cases when they
have access to a trusted female attorney.
Since this can all be accomplished without violating Islamic Sharia law, which is
strictly observed and integrated into the
official governmental law in Saudi Arabia,
the decision has garnered support from
both social activists and Saudi government
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officials. Social activists hope that the draft
law will pave the way for more reforms that
would grant Saudi women more rights.
However, in the midst of high expectations for positive reforms, a recent case
sentencing a woman to 300 lashes serves as
a bitter reminder of the reality for women
in Saudi Arabia. In January 2010, Sawsan
Salim was charged with “making spurious
complaints against government officials”
and “visiting government offices without a
male guardian” when she filed a complaint
claiming that a judge had sexually harassed
her. While the new draft law should be
lauded by the international community and
human rights activists world-wide, Saudi
Arabia still has to undergo substantial
institutional changes before women will be
equal members of society.

Algerian Civil Society Demands
Accountability for Systematic
Disappearances
Families of the disappeared in Jijel,
Algeria are calling on the Working
Group on Enforced and Involuntary
Disappearances (WGEID) to address the
nearly 300 disappearances between 1994
and 1997 and to provide some means of
reconciliation. Abductions and subsequent
disappearances of civilians, especially
supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), were very common during that time.
Groups like the Mich’al Association for
the Missing Children of Jijel, Association
of the Families of Disappeared of Jijel
(AFDJ), and the Algerian League for the
Defense of Human Rights assert that the
Algerian government was responsible for
this program of systematic disappearances
and executions.
The FIS, which was banned in 1992,
was a key actor in Algeria’s descent into
civil war from 1991 to 2002. Characterized
by its free-market and Islamic agendas,
the party quickly gained popularity. After
the FIS won 55 percent of the vote in
Algeria’s first round of elections in 1990,
the government responded quickly and
redrew district lines to prevent FIS from
winning the second round of elections.
FIS’s protests of gerrymandering triggered
a shockingly violent eleven-year civil war.
During this time, there were many disappearances in the Jijel governorate, near the
Benni Khettab mountains where the FIS’s
Islamic Salvation Army was based, allegedly conducted by secret service operations

and militias the government dispatched to
quell opposition.
Victims and families of the disappeared
have been unable to solicit substantive
assistance from the domestic government
or the international community and the
Algerian government has yet to reply to
calls for investigation. Although Algeria
signed the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances, it has yet to ratify the
instrument. Article 24 of the Convention
requires States Parties provide reparations
to victims of disappearances and any individual who has suffered harm as a direct
result of disappearances. Moreover, while
Algeria it not a party to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, it demonstrates a consensus in the international
community as to the gravity of forced
disappearances, which are listed as a crime
against humanity under Article 7.
After exhausting efforts to compel a
governmental response, Algerian human
rights NGOs turned to the United Nations.
The AFDJ, which has been reporting the
Jijel disappearances to the WGEID for
years, made its latest appeal together with
Mich’al Association, reporting 104 additional cases on December 31, 2009. Despite
their efforts, these NGOs still have not
received any response from the WGEID.
The story of the Jijel governorate is
indicative of a problem that plagues most
Algerians. In 2007, the International Center
for Transitional Justice went Algiers to participate in a national conference on creating
a truth commission in Algeria, but Algerian
authorities prevented the meeting from taking place. Though the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights could provide
an appropriate venue for victims to express
their grievances, it did not respond to complaints brought by the Collective of Families
of the Disappeared in Algeria in 2007.
Some Algerians have received monetary
compensation through the Algerian Charter
for Peace and National Reconciliation,
but victims say that it is not enough and
demand to be told what happened to their
loved ones. Moreover, the Charter granted
amnesty to individuals who fought in the
National Popular Army, security forces,
and state sponsored groups — individuals
against whom families of the disappeared
will want to seek action when give the
opportunity. In order to ensure a stable,
democratic future, the government and the
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international community need to ensure
that the perpetrators of these grave human
rights violations are held accountable to
ensure justice for the families of the disappeared and broader societal reconciliation.

Sudanese Elections: On the Road
to Independence or to Humanitarian
Crisis?
On April 11, Sudanese went to the polls
for the first time in more than twenty years
in a highly anticipated election. The activity leading up to the vote has been arguably
more controversial than the election itself.
In early April, Yasir Arman, the presidential candidate for the Sudan Peoples’
Liberation Movement (SPLM), announced
his intention to boycott the presidential
elections, protesting against alleged fraud
and instability undermining the elections.
The SPLM, which is rooted in Southern
Sudan and is the country’s main opposition party, still ran candidates in the parliamentary and municipal elections in the
south and in two northern states. Following
Arman’s lead, Sudan’s other main opposition parties also withdrew, leaving only
smaller party candidates to contest the
National Congress Party (NCP) candidate,
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.
While some observers warned that the
candidates’ would foster a violent political environment, experts speculated that
the implications of the withdrawal were
not as far-reaching as they may have first
appeared. Rather, the SPLM and residents of Southern Sudan may have understood the elections to be a formality and,
instead, remained invested in the 2011
referendum on independence. Still, the
elections carried high stakes. Some argued
that a boycott of the national elections
could be a breach of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, executed between the
SPLM and the Government of Sudan in
2005, jeopardizing the 2011 referendum
for Southern Sudanese independence.
The elections are pivotal in determining
whether Southern Sudan will attain independence in 2011, and the severity of the
accompanying political climate.
With the SPLM vigorously vying for
independence, the partitioning of Sudan
may very well be inevitable. Regardless of
the outcome, the international community
will need to prepare itself for an escalating
humanitarian crisis in Southern Sudan and
the country as a whole. Although President
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Bashir has been scaling back his criticism against independence, there remains
a strong possibility that the NCP will try
to delay the independence referendum.
The south contains two-thirds of Sudan’s
oil reserves, with which the government of
Sudan is not likely to part without a fight.
As the current government has already
overseen genocide in Darfur, their potential
for violent repression is not to be underestimated.
The international community will have
to be just as prepared, if not more so, if
Southern Sudan votes for independence in
2011. As representatives from Khartoum
have inflicted violence upon Southern
Sudan, so too has the SPLM. Southern
Sudan is rife with corruption, exploitation, disappearances, rape, kidnapping, and
murder, often at the hands of the SPLM.
In the event of southern independence, the
governing authority’s practices will need to
be monitored to ensure respect for the individual and collective rights of the people of
Southern Sudan. Further, the international
community may need to assist the southern
government with capacity building to help
it cope with health, food, and governance
issues.
Operating under the responsibility
to protect principle, current humanitarian efforts in Sudan have been sharply
criticized for implementing oversimplified Western ideals without considering
the political and social realities in Sudan.
These efforts have been deemed unprepared, focusing their efforts on the dayto-day, rather than on the possibility of an
impending humanitarian crisis. Whatever
the criticisms, it is vital that the international community prepare, whether by
adjusting or by broadening its practices, for
the instability and humanitarian repercussions that will likely follow the elections.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Middle East and North
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

Europe
Albania’s New Anti-Discrimination
Law Protects LGBT Rights
Human Rights advocacy groups worldwide hailed Albania’s inclusive anti-discrimination law as a victory for equal
protection from all forms of discrimina-

tion, including discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity. A
unanimous Legislative Assembly passed
and Prime Minister Sali Berisha signed
off on the broad anti-discrimination bill
on February 4, 2010. The law, which took
effect in March, expressly protects lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
Albanians, but also extends protection on
the grounds of disability, race, ethnicity,
and religion. If properly enforced, the
anti-discrimination law will be the most
progressive in the region, since it bans
discrimination not only in employment, but
also in other areas of life.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) played a
vital role in bringing this law to fruition
through over a year of campaigning on the
issue. In February 2009, HRW organized
a roundtable discussion in Tirana with the
participation of ten Albanian human rights
organizations, including Aleanca Kunder
Diskriminimit LGBT (Alliance against
LGBT Discrimination), to discuss antidiscrimination protections. These ten organizations prepared and submitted the first
draft of the bill to the Albanian government
for discussion.
This law comes in response to high levels of homophobia documented in Albania
and the previous absence of legal protections for LGBT communities. While
human rights groups hail the bill as a
major victory, there are concerns that religious groups will try to slow down its
adoption into civil society. Few modern
Albanians are actively religious; however,
three strong religions continue to dominate
the country’s value system: Catholicism,
Orthodox Christianity, and Islam. Due to
lobbying by these religious groups, a same
sex marriage-equality provision, included
in the proposed draft of the bill, was omitted from the text of the final law.
LGBT communities are frequently subjected to intolerance, physical and psychological violence, and police mistreatment. Thus, human rights groups actively
encourage the Office of the Commissioner
for the Protection of Equality and the
Ministry of Labor to implement an adequate enforcement mechanism, with the
staff and expertise needed to fight discrimination and ensure that homosexuality and
gender identity are no longer taboo.
Some view this law as an attempt by
the Albanian government to fulfill part
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of the human rights requirements placed
on it as a candidate for ascension to the
EU. EU membership requires all countrycandidates to adopt comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation in accordance
with the European Convention on Human
Rights, which prohibits discrimination
against LGBT persons. Albania’s initiative
in civil rights provides a strong example for
other EU-membership candidates, such as
Macedonia, which recently removed sexual
orientation from one of the banned grounds
for discrimination in an anti-discrimination
bill. Although homophobia remains prevalent in Albanian society and discrimination
based on sexual orientation is widespread
in the Balkans, this law is the first step to
building a more open society founded on
equal protection for all, and gives human
rights activists a strong legal platform to
battle discrimination.

Ireland’s Anti-Abortion Law Comes
under Criticism
The Republic of Ireland, a deeply
Catholic country, is the only remaining
Member State of the European Union that
allows abortions only where there is a
substantial risk to the life of the mother.
In 1983, Ireland amended its constitution
to include a “Pro-Life Amendment,” which
asserts that the unborn child has an explicit
right to life from the moment of conception. As a result, under the current law, it is
illegal to have an abortion in Ireland even if
the woman’s health is at risk, the pregnancy
is the result of rape or incest, the fetus
would not survive outside of the womb, or
the continuation of the pregnancy would
not be in the best interest of the mother. In
contrast, 44 of the 47 Council of Europe
Member States allow abortions in the
majority of these circumstances, especially
to save the mother’s life or where the pregnancy is the result of incest or rape.
In many cases, Irish women seeking
abortions travel to other European countries
to have the procedure. From 1980 to 2008,
137,618 Irish women traveled to the UK to
have an abortion. However, the Republic
of Ireland has started to use injunctions
to prevent women from traveling abroad
for abortions. According to Human Rights
Watch, a seventeen-year-old girl in the custody of a Health Services Executive had to
get court permission to travel to the UK for
an abortion. The government also places
restrictions on when and how organizations
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can provide information regarding access
to abortion services abroad. Moreover,
due to unclear legal and policy guidelines
about legal abortions, even women who
may qualify for legal abortions in Ireland
cannot obtain them for fear of severe penalties, which may include penal servitude
for life for both women undergoing and
doctors performing abortions. As a result,
some doctors are reluctant to provide prenatal screening for severe fetal abnormalities, and very few women have access to
domestic legal abortions.
The international legal community has
taken notice. Last year, the UN Human
Rights Committee criticized Ireland’s laws
on abortion during the country’s Universal
Periodic Review and recommended that
the country harmonize its domestic litigation with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On
December 9, 2009, the Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) heard ABC v. Ireland, the first
case in the ECtHR to challenge Ireland’s
anti-abortion laws in more than fifteen
years. The case involves three women who
are challenging the ban on grounds that
it forces women to travel abroad to procure abortions, jeopardizing their health
and well-being in violation of their rights
under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). The specific ECHR provisions cited are Article 2 (right to life);
Article 3 (prohibition of torture); Article 8
(right to respect for family and private life);
and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). Pro-choice advocacy groups argue
that ABC v. Ireland has a better chance for
success than its predecessor, D v. Ireland,
because it directly challenges Ireland’s
general prohibition on abortion rather than
make an inroad through a particular exception. In D v. Ireland, a pregnant woman
challenged the lack of abortion services in
Ireland in the case of a lethal fetal abnormality.
This case has significant consequences
for both Ireland and the entire European
community. As suggested by Johanna
Higgins, co-founder of the Association of
Catholic Lawyers of Ireland, a ruling in
favor of the three women might signal to
EU Member States that they are no longer
free to make certain decisions concerning
their own domestic law, which is often
rooted in unique historical, religious, and
cultural principles.

Judge Baltasar Garzón Faces
Criminal Charges for Probing into
the Fate of Spain’s Disappeared
Nearly thirty years after the end of the
Francisco Franco regime, a lawyer visited
ninety-year-old Teofila Gonzalez at her
retirement home in 2008 and told her
that one of the eleven bodies found in the
exhumation of a mass grave, ordered by
Judge Baltasar Garzón, was identified as
her brother, Severiano. Severiano had been
a left-wing Republican who was captured,
held at the village church, and then dragged
away in a cart, never to be seen again.
Garzón is currently under criminal
investigation by Audiencia Nacional,
Spain’s highest criminal court, for breaching his duties as a judge and launching an inquiry on October 16, 2008 into
22 alleged cases of illegal detention and
forced disappearances, involving more
than 100,000 victims, committed during
the country’s civil war (1936-1939) and
General Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975).
In October 2008, Garzón ordered the
exhumation of mass graves in response
to a petition filed by thirteen associations of the victims’ families. For the first
time in Spanish history, someone was
attempting to establish accountability for
the killings of thousands of left-wingers,
union members, and other opponents of
the regime who were disappeared over
seventy years earlier. Aside from political
opposition by the Popular Party and the
Catholic Church, Garzón faced several
legal obstacles, including a 1977 amnesty
law that granted immunity for all political
crimes committed prior to December 1976
as part of a national reconciliation program. In a 68-page report presented to the
court, Garzón alleged that the illegal detention and disappearance of victims are not
subject to the 1977 amnesty law because
they can be characterized as crimes against
humanity, therefore subject to universal
jurisdiction. Garzón also rejected any statute of limitations, reasoning that the crimes
are ongoing since Franco waged a systematic campaign to eliminate opponents
and hide their bodies, and the bodies are
still missing. Contrary to the Prosecutor’s
objections, a Law on Historical Memory,
passed in 2007 to bar victims’ potential
legal claims, does not prevent investigations on crimes against humanity.
According to Amnesty International,
blocking Garzón’s war crimes investiga47

tions would violate Spain’s obligations
under international law. A country’s
refusal to acknowledge the detention or
whereabouts of victims of persecution
is an enforced disappearance and a violation of the 2006 Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Convention against
Enforced Disappearance), passed by the
UN General Assembly and ratified by
Spain in 2009. This convention has not
yet entered into force. The ICCPR, which
Spain ratified in 1977, obligates governments “to ensure that any person whose
rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall
have an effective remedy.” In addition,
Garzón urged the court to apply ex post
facto law (law created after the fact), specifically Article 5 of the Convention against
Enforced Disappearance, as had been done
during the Nuremberg trials. Most recently,
the ECtHR held in 2009 that an amnesty
law contradicts a state’s duty to investigate
acts of torture or barbarity. It is ironic that
the Spanish government and especially
the Prosecutor’s Office are challenging
Garzón’s efforts, since they extended their
support when Garzón issued an indictment
against Chilean General Augusto Pinochet
for the murder and torture of thousands and
when he led Mexico to extradite Ricardo
Miguel Cavallo, a former military official
from Argentina implicated in atrocities
during the country’s military dictatorship.
Annamaria Racota, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Europe for the Human
Rights Brief.

South and Central Asia
Tajikistan: Fears of Refugee Influx
May Lead to Legal Reform
Since 2001, Tajikistan has seen an
influx of refugees over its southern border with Afghanistan. Amid new NATO
offensives and resurgent Taliban forces, it
is feared that the number of refugees from
Afghanistan may become unmanageable.
The number of Afghan refugees in
Tajikistan has tripled since 2008, with a
reported 100 to 200 refugees entering the
country every month. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), 5,000 Afghan refugees are currently residing in Tajikistan.
As NATO and Afghan forces intervene
in the southern region of Afghanistan,

Wilson et al.: International Legal Updates
and Taliban forces continue attacks in the
north, the number of refugees is expected
to continue to increase, reaching an estimated 7,000 refugees in 2010.
Although there is peace on the
Tajikistan side of the border, life is continually difficult for Afghan refugees.
There are limited services established for
refugees in Tajikistan, which according
to International Crisis Group, is on the
fringe of becoming a failed state ten years
after its own civil war. UNHCR provides
refugee households with less than U.S.
$10 a month; meanwhile, the refugees
face language barriers, discrimination,
and massive unemployment. Creating further problems, many Tajik citizens see the
influx of refugees as a threat to an already
scarce job market. Though the budget for
UNHCR programs in Central Asia is at its
highest level in recent years, new influxes
of refugees will require even greater costs.
Tajikistan has ratified both the 1951
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees,
but has yet to bring its Refugee Status
Determination (RSD) process and refugee legislation up to international standards. The imminent influx of refugees has
facilitated increased collaboration between
UNHCR and the government of Tajikistan,
providing UNHCR with a major opportunity to push for reform of refugee policies
in the region.
In the past, UNHCR has sought to
train government officials, institutions
dealing with refugees, and Tajik border
guards regarding refugee protection; it
also implemented a resettlement program, which ended in 2006. While some
of these older programs may continue,
there is a significant need to improve
documentation provided to refugees. A
recently established Refugee Department
under Tajikistan’s Ministry of the Interior
could facilitate domestic RSD legislation.
According to the UNHCR 2010 Regional
Operations Profile for Central Asia, comprehensive plans to reduce statelessness
and to increase integration and resettlement programs are also top priorities.
There are plans to attempt local integration
of refugees who have been in Tajikistan for
longer periods and repatriation of willing
refugees. Additionally, through assistance
from NGOs and the Tajikistan government,
UNHCR hopes to implement programs to
address children’s education, health care

needs, and women’s empowerment among
refugee populations.
Though Tajikistan may be on the brink
of failure itself, the threat of an immense
increase in refugees could be the needed
catalyst for overdue reform of refugee laws
in the region.

Reports of Sri Lankan Hit-List Stir
Fears of Activist and Journalist
Persecution
In early March 2010, a Sri Lankan
government document was leaked, which
as reported by Amnesty International, contained a list of 35 of the foremost journalists and NGO officers who were under surveillance by the Sri Lankan secret service.
Each name was followed by a grade, denoting those with the highest significance to
the secret service.
Amnesty International fears for the
safety of the activists named on the list.
Ranking at the top of the list and of
chief concern to Amnesty International
are Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu,
Executive Director of the Center for Policy
Alternatives (CPA), and J.C. Weliamuna,
Director of Transparency International
Sri Lanka (TISL). Both CPA and TISL
monitored the January 2010 presidential
elections in Sri Lanka, and both reported
on the misuse of resources and electoral
violations.
When news of the list reached the two
executive directors in March 2010, they
wrote a joint letter to President Mahinda
Rajapaksa, protesting the list’s necessity.
The activists were not completely caught
off guard, however, as both have endured
numerous threats to their safety in the two
years prior. In September 2008, a grenade
was launched at Weliamuna’s property,
but no one was injured; the investigation
that followed the incident was inadequate.
More recently, in February 2010, a Sri
Lankan newspaper reported that President
Rajapaksa stated “something must be
done” about Weliamuna during a meeting
with Freedom Party lawyers. Likewise, in
August 2009, Saravanamuttu received an
anonymous death threat, which was not
investigated.
Amnesty International has also voiced
concern for 56 Sri Lankan journalists who
are thought to face threats. According to
Amnesty International, since 2006, journalists have been killed, detained, tor48

tured, and forced to leave the country after
receiving death threats. None of the allegations have been thoroughly investigated.
The “hit-list” is the latest in a wave of
anti-journalist and -activist actions by the
government since the January 2010 elections. An ongoing media campaign strives
to discredit NGOs with claims that the organizations are attempting to undermine Sri
Lankan democracy. The government stated
that it has begun investigating and is seeking to take legal action against NGOs.
Additionally, four reporters who were in hiding since the January elections were arrested
in early March by the Terrorism Investigation
Division, due to their connection to opposition leader General Sarath Fonseka.
After allegations of the hit-list became
public, Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, Transparency International,
the Asian Human Rights Commission, the
International Federation of Journalists,
the Asian Legal Resource Center, and
Reporters without Borders all called
for a halt of the persecution of journalists, NGOs, and activists in Sri Lanka.
Transparency International has asked
the government to ensure the safety of
Transparency International staff and reaffirm freedom of expression. In a letter
to President Rajapaksa, the International
Federation of Journalists expressed its concern over the list’s purpose and called for
protection of those listed.
Despite the outcry from international
and Sri Lankan organizations over the hitlist, the Sri Lankan government denies, and
some media outlets remain unconvinced
of, its existence. The government accused
Amnesty International of bias, challenging
the organization to prove the document’s
existence. News of the list reportedly
appeared on a Sri Lankan website, Lanka
News Web, whose editor was also named.
According to the International Federation
of Journalists, the list is also being held
by diplomatic missions in Sri Lanka, giving the list’s existence more credibility.
Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan government
assured civil society and its critics that
there was no reason to fear for their physical safety.
If these allegations are confirmed,
they may further tarnish the Sri Lankan
government’s reputation as a democracy.
The United Nations Convention against
Corruption obligates States Parties to pro-

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 8
mote NGO and civil society involvement in
raising public awareness of governmental
corruption. Threats to the safety of activists and journalists severely undermine
this goal. Sri Lanka has signed and ratified
the Convention, which entered into force
in March 2004. The continuing state of
emergency in Sri Lanka, declared after the
defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May 2009,
assists the government by providing it with
an excuse to ignore its international obligations and continue the trend of silencing
those who speak out.

Bangladeshi War Crimes Tribunal in
the Works
In March 2010, almost forty years after
the 1971 fight for independence from
Pakistan, the Bangladeshi government created a war crimes tribunal to prosecute
those who committed atrocities during the
bloody nine-month conflict. The government estimates three million people were
killed during the war by Pakistani soldiers
and Bangladeshi collaborators. An estimated 200,000 women were raped, and the
numbers of displaced persons reached the
millions.
According to the Law Minister of
Bangladesh, Shafique Ahmed, the government named three high court judges, led by
Justice Nizamul Haque Nasim, to carry out
trials for rape, murder, arson, torture, and
genocide. A panel of retired Bangladeshi
officials and lawyers will be prosecuting
those suspected of forming auxiliary forces
to aid Pakistan in 1971.
The Law Ministry stated that the tribunal will be conducted according to a 1973
act that sets guidelines for the prosecution
of those accused of breaking international
law and committing crimes against humanity. The government has prohibited fifty
suspects from leaving the country, most of
whom are members of Jamaat-e-Islami,
the largest Islamic party in Bangladesh,
which sided with Pakistan during the war.
Allegedly, members of the party identified
victims for the Pakistani military and may
have assisted in killings. An estimated
1,600 people took part in the atrocities, but
those who were members of the Pakistani
army will not be subject to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. The government has provided
no explanation for this decision, bringing
criticism that the proceedings are victor’s
justice and the tribunal is a vehicle to
persecute political opposition. After the

war, collaborators who were not direct
perpetrators of heinous crimes were given
amnesty and will not be prosecuted in the
tribunal. Those with evidence or charges
against them for direct participation were
not given amnesty.
The creation of the tribunal is promising, though the undertaking has been
delayed since Bangladesh gained independence. Sheik Mujibur Rahman, founder
and leader of Bangladesh, began trials
of war criminals in 1973, but was assassinated before they could be completed.
Since then, political turmoil has hindered
the progress of the tribunal despite outcries
from victims’ families and veterans of the
war. The current Prime Minister, Sheik
Hasina, campaigned to prosecute war criminals, and Parliament passed a resolution
for swift trials in 2009, finally allowing for
the creation of the tribunal.
The renewed promise became action two
days after Bangladesh’s ratification of the
Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which defines the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. Bangladesh is the 111th nation in the
world, but the first in South Asia, to become
a State Party to the ICC. Bangladesh may
now need to reexamine the implementation
of its tribunal to ensure consistency with
the standards set forth in the Rome Statute,
which will enter into force June 2010. In
one notable example, the 1973 act creating the Bangladesh Tribunal allows for the
death penalty, a punishment that is not permitted under the Rome Statute. Though the
time lapse since the war may make it more
difficult to produce evidence and fair trials,
the United Nations has expressed its hope
that the trials operate according to international standards for which it is considering
sending observers.
Bhavani Raveendran, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers South and Central
Asia for the Human Rights Brief.

East Asia
Mongolia: Extreme Cold Resulting
in Malnutrition and Risk of Disease
Recently, the United Nations Children’s
Fund, with the cooperation of the government of Mongolia, airlifted essential emergency supplies to children living in rural
areas of Mongolia severely hit by extreme
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cold. Supplies included blankets, warm
clothing, fuel for heating and cooking, and
hygiene kits. Due to weeks of heavy snowfall, sixty percent of Mongolia was covered
by between eight to sixteen inches of snow,
with temperatures as low as negative fifty
degrees Celsius. At least six million livestock died of starvation, threatening the
lives of nomadic herders — third of the
population of Mongolia — who rely heavily on agriculture and herding.
With average winter temperatures
reaching as low as negative thirty degrees
Celsius, Mongolians are accustomed to
cold weather, however, this winter was the
harshest in thirty years. The government of
Mongolia declared a disaster in more than
half of the country’s 21 provinces, which
are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Mongolians call the harsh weather a
dzud, Mongolian for a severe winter with
heavy snow, strong winds, and extremely
low temperatures, preceded by a summer
drought. A dzud typically results in livestock deaths, because the prolonged dry
summer leaves insufficient feed for the following winter, and the extreme cold hardens the snow and ice, impeding grazing.
The fierce winter and loss of livestock
threatens herder families with serious food
shortages and poverty. Isolated by snow,
villagers do not have access to food, medical care, or other emergency services, and
at least eleven people, including nine children, have been reported dead. Since herding and agriculture are the backbone of
the rural economy in Mongolia, livestock
deaths means loss of income for many.
In addition to food shortages, potential
spread of disease caused by rotting animal
carcasses is a growing problem. The risk of
illness, including anthrax and salmonella
infection, is anticipated to rise once the
snow begins to melt.
Another possible effect of the extreme
weather is overpopulation of Mongolian
cities. After previous dzuds, many nomads
abandoned the grassland and moved to
capital, Ulaanbaatar, to seek jobs. Many
are forced to live in shantytowns without
access to water and heat because the cities
cannot support the influx.
In order to alleviate the consequences
of this dzud, international organizations and
NGOs have responded with humanitarian
assistance. The United Nations Population
Fund furnished medical and hygiene equipment to 6,000 pregnant mothers who were
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unable to go to health facilities. Moreover,
in order to prevent soil contamination and
the outbreak of disease, the United Nations
Development Program adopted a cash-forwork program to pay about 60,000 herders to
collect and bury the carcasses of the dead livestock. The program is an effective approach
since it produces income for nomads who
have lost their livestock and reduces health
risks to public at the same time.
While emergency needs are being
addressed, Mongolia’s heavy reliance on
livestock herding has become controversial. To prevent future losses of livestock,
experts urge Mongolia to restrict the use of
grasslands, as overgrazing has depleted the
useable pasture with the number of herds
increasing by half over the last twenty
years. Though the current focus should be
on humanitarian assistance, the government of Mongolia should also address the
long-term effects of the extreme weather
disaster and adopt policies to support the
nomadic herders.

Should a Criminal Suspect’s Face
Be Revealed? The Current Debate in
South Korea
On March 6, 2010, a thirteen-year-old
girl who had been missing since February
24, 2010, was found dead in a rooftop water
tank near her house in Busan, South Korea.
The naked body was covered with plastic
bags and calcium carbonate, and showed
signs of rape before suffocation. Based on
evidence, including a DNA sample from
the teenager’s body and a sweater dumped
near the water tank, police indentified Kim
Kil-tae as the main suspect. After hiding
successfully for fifteen days after the girl’s
disappearance, Kim was arrested four days
after the body was discovered. Charged
with rape and murder, Kim initially denied
all charges against him, but ultimately confessed to involvement in the crime.
In response to subsequent public outrage, police took unprecedented action and
revealed Kim’s face when he was taken
to the police station following his arrest.
Korean law and National Police Agency
guidelines require that police protect criminal suspects’ privacy by limiting media
access and refraining from releasing their
identities during ongoing investigations.
Under normal arrest procedures, police conceal a suspect’s face with baseball caps and
masks in public. In other countries, including the United States, France, and Japan, it

is very rare to find such police practices or
laws that specifically regulate the conduct
of law enforcement authorities regarding the
publicity of suspects’ identities.
The controversy over whether to disclose the identity of a criminal suspect
under investigation is not new in South
Korea. In 2009, when police arrested serial
killer Kang Ho-soon, the media exposed
his face, claiming the people had a right
to know his identity. The media and some
members of the public argue that full disclosure of a criminal suspect’s identity,
especially when there is a strong evidence
of guilt, ensures public safety and deters
crime. Opponents, relying on the principle
that suspects are innocent until proven
guilty, stress that exposing the identity of
a criminal suspect violates basic human
rights. They also argue that such exposure
inflicts emotional distress on the suspect’s
family members and makes reassimilation
into society upon release more difficult,
which in turn contributes to recidivism.
A petition was filed on March 12, 2010,
to the National Human Rights Commission
of Korea, alleging police wrongfully
exposed Kim’s face to the public. However,
there are indications that official police
procedure may change in South Korea.
The governing Grand National Party of
South Korea moved to amend the law
last year, adding a Release of Identities
Exception Provision to the Special Act
on Punishment of Violent Crimes. The
provision would allow disclosure of the
name, age, and face of criminal suspects
charged with serious crimes, such as murder, rape, or kidnapping, if police obtained
a confession or strong evidence of guilt.
The provision passed the Cabinet last July,
but is currently pending at the Legislation
and Judiciary Committee of the National
Assembly.
Different standards should apply for
those suspected of heinous crimes because
the safety of society is at higher risk.
Although there is no current rule classifying “heinous crimes,” a consistent and
clear standard could provide guidelines
to law enforcement authorities to protect both societal interests and individual
rights. Because of the high likelihood of
a conviction, when police have obtained a
confession or have strong evidence of guilt,
serving the public interest becomes more
important than preventing the possible
negative consequences of disclosure.
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Zero UPR Recommendations
Accepted by North Korea
One of the duties of the UN Human
Rights Council, established by UN General
Assembly Resolution 60/251 in 2006,
is to review human rights conditions of
each UN Member State. Composed of
47 elected representatives from Member
States, the Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) Working Group reviews each state’s
human rights record and makes recommendations as to actions it should take to
improve human rights conditions. In addition to the Working Group, any Member
State can participate during the interactive
dialogue with the states under review. Each
Member State is reviewed once every four
years; by 2011, all 192 Members will have
completed a UPR.
North Korea is a State Party to major
international human rights instruments:
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC). North Korea
underwent its first UPR in December 2009,
attracting special interests from the international community.
North Korea filed its National Report,
which explained the state’s basic positions
on human rights, described its institutions
and laws promoting human rights, and
illustrated current obstacles in protecting its citizens’ rights. The Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) filed a compilation of recommendations from other UN committees and
offices and the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in North Korea
NGOs, including Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and the Asia
Centre for Human Rights, reported human
rights violations in North Korea through
the OHCHR Summary of stakeholders’
information.
During the country’s review on December
7, 2009, Ri Tcheul, the Ambassador of
North Korea to the United Nations, and
twelve members of the North Korean delegation engaged in discussions with 52
countries. Member States expressed grave
concerns about North Korean political
prison camps, the use of torture, public
executions, and forced labor. The participant
countries also listed 117 recommendations
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for North Korea. They advised North Korea
to take measures to fully comply with international human rights instruments to which
it is a State Party, including the ICCPR,
the ICESCR, the CEDAW, and the CRC,
which together demand respect for the rights
of freedom of expression, association and
movement, and ensuring that its citizens
have adequate access to food.
Two days after the review, however,
Ri Tcheul announced that North Korea
rejected fifty of the recommendations
outright, and that it would soon examine the others. At the closing session of
North Korea’s UPR on March 18, 2010, Ri
Tcheul, without providing any additional
explanation, reaffirmed North Korea’s previous statement that it rejected fifty of the
proposals.
UN Member States, including South
Korea, the United States, Japan, and
France, expressed their disappointment
about North Korea’s vague response and
failure to elaborate on which recommendations it would accept or reject. Although
some countries considered North Korea’s
participation in the UPR an important
indication of its willingness to discuss and
review human rights issues, the significance of the review is meaningless if North
Korea disregards the recommendations.
North Korea is obligated to respect,
protect, and fulfill the rights enumerated in
the treaties to which the country is a State
Party. Unfortunately, there is no direct
enforcement mechanism to compel North
Korea to comply with these obligations;
however, the UPR process is politically
influential. If North Korea does not sincerely consider the Member States’ recommendations, it will jeopardize the country’s
position on the international stage and
bring increased scrutiny and criticism for
lack of commitment to international collaboration. The importance of international
political pressure for the enforcement of
human rights underscores that the UN
Member States and international organizations must not give up on North Korea.
Until North Korea’s second UPR in 2013,
they should continue to pressure one of the
world’s most defiant countries to comply
with its treaty obligations and improve
human rights.
Ri Yoo, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers East Asia for the Human Rights Brief.

Southeast Asia and Oceania
Solidarity Through Food
In response to a recent spike in racially
motivated attacks against Indian students
in Australia, one citizen has taken it upon
herself to show support for the Indian community in her city. Mia Northrop, a digital
media designer and resident of Melbourne,
created an event called Vindaloo Against
Violence and advertised it through
Facebook, a social networking website. The
concept behind Northrop’s campaign was
simple. Participants should eat out at, or
order in from, Indian restaurants throughout Melbourne. According to the Vindaloo
Against Violence website, the event would
allow Melbournians to “express their anger
and disappointment that racially motivated
violence is occurring in their city, embrace
and show solidarity with the local Indian
community, [and] mount a show of force
against the perpetrators of violence.”
Over the last year, tensions have risen
both between Australia and India, and
between Australian and Indian communities within Australia, over racially motivated attacks against Indian students. The
first of these highly publicized attacks
occurred in May 2009 when a 25-year-old
Indian student was repeatedly stabbed in
the head with a screwdriver at a birthday party in Melbourne. Some authorities in Australia claim that the attacks
occur because the perpetrators see Indian
students as “soft targets.” The Australian
government, in an attempt to improve its
image and assure potential students that the
country is safe, has created a taskforce to
look into accusations of racially motivated
violence and inadequate police response.
Tensions, however, remain high, as many
Indian student leaders say certain issues
still need to be resolved.
Vindaloo Against Violence started
with only 100 registered supporters. On
February 24, 2010, however, over 17,000
Australians participated in the event, eating at over 400 Indian restaurants. Many
Melbourne police officers and politicians
dined out in support of the movement,
and local parliaments across Australia
served Indian foods in their cafeterias.
People in Tokyo, New York, Amsterdam,
and Stockholm also connected through
Facebook and hosted their own events in
solidarity with Australians.
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Many Indian newspapers, including the
Bangalore Mirror and the Times of India,
covered the event in a positive light, a dramatic change from the consistently negative
coverage of the attacks and accusations of
racism previously appearing in such papers.
According to John Brumby, Premier of
Victoria, the province in which Melbourne
is located, the “Vindaloo Against Violence
initiative is a unique opportunity for
Victorian[s] to unite and send a message
that the actions of an ignorant few will not
be allowed to undermine the reputation of
Melbourne as a peaceful and friendly city.”
Brumby himself participated in the campaign by dining at a local Indian restaurant
with several Indian students.
Social media sites like Facebook are
playing a growing role in human rights
activism by helping to organize grassroots
action and educate a global audience about
human rights abuses. These sites make it
relatively easy to publicize issues, organize
activism events, and gather and publish evidence of abuses. For example in February
2008, a Colombian engineer and five of his
friends started a Facebook group called “No
More FARC,” in protest of the practices and
tactics of the Colombian guerilla movement.
The group, now called “A Million Voices
Against FARC,” has over 430,000 members.
The group’s members organized a protest in
early 2008, which quickly spread to millions
of protesters in 140 cities worldwide. Social
media also played a critical role in the protests following the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, many of which were coordinated in part through Facebook and Twitter,
the microblogging service. Videos of the
protest were also uploaded to YouTube,
where they have been viewed by millions of
people worldwide.

Truth and Reconciliation in the
Solomon Islands
The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) launched its
first public hearings on March 10, marking
an important step forward in the national
quest for reconciliation following the fiveyear ethnic conflict that ended in 2003.
Nineteen victims testified over two days,
publicly recounting experiences they have
rarely spoken about, even in private. One
woman, Edith Padavisu, told of an attack on
her husband in Guadalcanal in April 1999.
She described how militants used bush
knives, spears and guns in their assault, after
which they left her husband to die.
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Ethnic tensions on Guadalcanal, the
largest of the Solomon Islands, have roots
back to independence in 1978. Guadalcanal
natives believed ethnic Malaita settlers from
other islands had acquired a disproportionate amount of jobs and land on Guadalcanal.
These tensions escalated to violence in
December 1998, when the Guadalcanal
Revolutionary Army (also known as the
Istambu Freedom Fighters) began a campaign to force Malaitan settlers to leave
Guadalcanal. Malaitans formed their own
competing militia, the Malaita Eagle Force.
Fighting continued until 2003, when a
regional coalition of troops from Australia
and other Pacific islands arrived to restore
stability. During the conflict, more than 100
people were killed and 20,000 displaced.
Many others suffered various human rights
abuses, including torture.
Although the armed conflict has ended,
the Solomon Islands continue to experience
political instability and ethnic tensions, due
in large part to unaddressed issues and
unanswered questions. The current Prime
Minister Derek Sikua, who took office in
2007, made reconciliation an official top
priority. This included the establishment, in
2008, of the TRC, tasked with investigating
the causes of the conflict and the nature and
extent of human rights abuses during that
period; evaluating the impact of the conflict
on the educational, health and other sectors;
and making recommendations on how to
prevent future conflict.
Borrowing from the South African
model, the TRC is composed of five members, three nationals and two non-nationals,
who lead public hearings in which victims,
witnesses, and perpetrators can testify.
The TRC was officially launched in April
2009, with an appearance by Archbishop
Desmond Tutu. Over the next year, the
TRC held workshops around the country
to inform citizens about its work and the
opportunities available to them. The TRC
plans to hold seven more hearings this year,
the next on the island of Malaita. Many
witnesses have already volunteered to testify at future hearings.
One crucial component has been
absent from the hearings: testimony from
the perpetrators. Witnesses and victims
have called for the perpetrators to testify,
so that the whole community can benefit
from the TRC and begin to move forward.
Selwyn Kei, a victim testifying before the
TRC, asked for the chance to forgive his

perpetrators. He said, “I am asking you, my
perpetrators, to come forward to reconcile
with me. Together we can carry our nation
forward.” Father Samual Ata, the Chair of
the TRC, supported these calls for perpetrators to step forward, not for judgment
but for reconciliation, pronouncing “We
definitely encourage them to testify. It is
very important, because the perpetrators do
also need healing.”

Malaysian High Court declared that the
Orang Asli have a proprietary interest in
their customary lands, including the right
to use and derive profit from the land. The
Court further declared that Orang Asli land
fell under the Land Acquisition Act, which
governs all land acquisition in Malaysia,
and that the government taking of the land
required compensation in the same manner as non-Orang Asli land. The Court of
Appeal affirmed the decision.

Indigenous Malaysians Insist on
Enforcement of Customary Land
Rights

The proposed bill, which the Orang Asli
oppose, is an amendment to the Aboriginal
People’s Act. The amendment would offer
each Orang Asli family two to six acres of
land, but once they accept that land, they
lose all future claims to any other customary land. Furthermore, the amendment
would limit the total Orang Asli land to
fifty thousand hectares, an amount substantially less than the 129,000 hectares
they claim. Orang Asli groups assert that
the amendment also imposes conditions on
the land, such as prohibiting rental without
state permission and mandating that the
planting of certain crops be managed by
private developers.

More than 1,000 indigenous Orang Asli
people gathered in Putrajaya, Malaysia
on March 17 to protest a land bill, which,
under the guise of granting land, refuses to
adhere to judicially recognized indigenous
land rights and severely limits the amount
of Orang Asli land. Elders of the three
main Orang Asli communities led members of various tribes in what the Center
for Orang Asli Concerns claims to have
been the largest gathering of Orang Asli
in history. Although the elders planned for
the protest to lead to the Prime Minister’s
offices, police diverted most to the Rural
and Regional Development Ministry,
where the leaders submitted a memorandum explaining their complaints against
the land bill. After receiving the memorandum, the Rural and Regional Development
Minister assured those gathered that the
government would look into their complaints and attempt to reconcile them with
the proposed bill.
Orang Asli is the name given to all
eighteen non-Malay indigenous tribes on
the Malay Peninsula, which total around
150,000 people. Orang Asli land rights are
governed by the Aboriginal People’s Act of
1954. Under this Act, the state may declare
an area customarily and currently inhabited by Orang Asli to be an “aboriginal
area.” Orang Asli have exclusive rights of
occupancy of this customary land and use
of its natural resources, but have no rights
of ownership. They cannot sell, lease, or
grant this land without permission from the
Commissioner of Aboriginal Affairs, a post
which has never been held by an Orang
Asli. The government may take the land at
any time, and must only pay compensation
for the value of the crops and dwelling on
the land, not the land itself.
Nevertheless, in the 2002 case Sagong
bin Tasi v. Selangor State Government, the
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Many civil society groups, including the Malaysian Bar Association, have
strongly supported Orang Asli rights. The
Bar Association issued a press release urging the government to “formally recognise,
protect and guarantee [Orang Asli] rights
to all their ancestral lands,” and to withdraw any proposed legislation that would
limit these rights. Commentators also insist
that the government uphold its commitments under the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states
that indigenous peoples have “the right to
the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.”
The Malaysian government must move
forward in the area of indigenous rights, and
live up to international standards if it wishes
to gain the respect of the international community. The government must fulfill its
obligations under its domestic legal system,
as decided by the High Court in Sagong bin
Tasi, and not attempt to appease the Orang
Asli community by granting them, with significant conditions, part of the land that they
already own in full.
Aileen Thomson, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, covers the Southeast Asia and Oceania
column for the Human Rights Brief. HRB

